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ABSTRACT. The smart meter is an important intelligent device on the 
Smart Grid that has the capability to report information related to power 
consumption, billing and other significant readings. The protection of smart 
meter communications against attacks is essential to ensure reliable opera-
tions of the Smart Grid. In this paper, we give an overview of smart meter 
applications, and we discuss the security issues and attacks that can be per-
formed on the smart meter and that may have severe impacts on the global 
Smart Grid network. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The Smart Grid is an intelligent electric network that aims to improve the current energy 
delivery in terms of efficiency, reliability and economics. It remotely and rapidly repairs 
faults, maintains and restores stability for more reliable delivery of the electric power. Also, it 
permits a flexible usage of renewable energy resources. Moreover, it allows customers to 
reduce and manage their energy consumption based on their own preferences. In order to 
harmonize Smart Grid architectures, the National Institute of Standards and Technologies 
(NIST) issued an architecture that defines heterogeneous systems and devices over various 
domains: Bulk Generation, Transmission, Distribution, Customers, Operations, Markets and 
Service Provider (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2010). To adapt this 
architecture to the European model of the electrical grid, IEEE introduced a new domain 
called distributed energy resources that provide the capability to control and monitor the dis-
tributed energy resources. Furthermore, the IEEE established the standard 2030-2011that 
defines the Smart Grid Interoperability References Model (SGIRM) (IEEE Standards Coordi-
nating Committee, 2011). This model defines a set of networks that allows domains to com-
municate. The Home Area Network (HAN) allows the communication of smart meter and 
intelligent devices such as thermostats, lighting for energy management. The Neighborhood 
Area Network (NAN) involves neighboring meters as relays if no direct uplink exists to a 
concentrator node that collect periodic information of HAN such as price information, energy 
consumption. The Field Area Network (FAN) contains the communication of a large number 
of Intelligent Electronic Devices IED devices (Feeder, switcher, closer, transformer) (Skopik, 
Ma, Bleier, & Grüneis., 2012).  The Wide Area Network (WAN) connects concentrators and 
substations to the operation domain (Kuzlu, Pipattanasomporn, Rahman, 2014). The Smart 
Grid introduces new security issues due to architecture characteristics and the critical nature 
of applications in terms of delay, sensitive and personal data exchanged. Many works in the 
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literature showed that several attacks can be performed on devices and systems involved in 
the Smart Grid (Wang & Lu, 2013; Aloul, Al-Ali, Al-Dalky, Al-Mardini, El-Hajj, 2012; 
Skopik et al., 2012). The NIST report7628 (The Smart Grid Interoperability Panel, 2011) 
identified the impact level (low, moderate or high) of security requirements (confidentiality, 
integrity and availability) for Smart Grid communications. In the customer's domain, a fun-
damental device called smart meter is connected to the control center and allows the remote 
collection of metering readings. In addition, it is able to balance the usage of energy inside 
home in order to avoid energy peaks and it allows consumers to adapt their energy use in line 
based on accurate information and cut down on energy waste to provide financial savings. 
Few works in the literature were interested on the security issues of the smart meter. Works of 
(Aloul et al., 2012; Sophia, Sekercioglu & Ahmet, 2012; Temple, Binbin & Nils-Ole, 2013; 
Namboodiri, Aravinthan, Mohapatra, Karimi, & Jewell, 2013; Skopik et al., 2012) identified 
some attacks on smart meter and showed that attacks against this device can have several 
impacts on the electricity grid. Identifying smart meter applications and the data flow ex-
changed can constitute a good starting point to study the security of this critical device. In this 
paper, we discuss security issues of the smart meter. We first present an overview of Smart 
meter applications and data exchanged by the smart meter with several devices and systems. 
In a second section, we present an overview of works dealing with the smart meter security 
issues. Then we identify and classify additional attacks that can be performed on the smart 
meter. A conclusion addresses the smart meter security challenges and future works. 
SMART METER: APPLICATIONS AND DATA FLOW 
We give, in this section, an overview of smart meter applications and the data flow. 
Smart home applications 
Automated Control of Home Appliances (ACHA): the energy management in HAN is performed by 
the smart meter to balance loads between home devices over time and avoid overloading (Ah-
mad, 2011). For example, the smart meter allows the charging of an Electronic Vehicle (EV) 
only when energy consumption is low. The smart meter takes the decision to turn on a device 
depending on dynamic pricing and energy availability.  
Management of Energy Storage (MES): Energy can be stored in storage sources and delivered 
to the electrical grid when it is required (Kenneth, Budka Jayant & Thottan, 2014). For exam-
ple, vehicle batteries can be used to store energy when prices are low and sell it back to the 
grid when prices are higher.  
 Smart meter control applications  
 Automated Meter Reading (AMR): The smart Meter provides energy measurement (con-
sumption amounts, time of consumption, devices, energy of renewable resources…) and au-
tomatic remote data in a regular interval (between 5 to 15 minutes) to the control center 
(Kenneth et al., 2014).  
Pricing and Billing Services (PBS): Distributed utilities communicate frequently electrici-
ty prices to smart meters. Therefore, customers can use electronic devices that need large 
loads (e.g. Electronic vehicle, stove, and washer) when power supply costs are relatively low. 
Furthermore, the control center is able to disconnect the smart meter from the electricity net-
work when a customer does not pay the electricity bill.  
 Outage Detection (OD): By gathering data and outage notifications from smart meters, the 
Outage Management System (OMS) can quickly analyses and determines if an outage is with-
in the private residence or not. This is will reduce outage times and costs.  
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 Smart meter distribution applications  
Demand Response (DR): the demand response application helps to improve the balance 
between energy supply and demand on the distribution grid (Romer, Reichhart, Kranz, & 
Picot, 2012; Kenneth et al., 2014). For that, the distribution substation can request from smart 
meters in a district to reduce energy consumption by shutting down some home electronic 
devices to reduce peak power. 
Electronic Vehicle Charging (EVC): The Electronic Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE) 
can interact with the smart meter over NAN to allow EV charging at public charging stations. 
Renewable Energy Production (REP): when the home distributed energy resource gener-
ates more electricity than usual consumer needs, the electricity goes into the electric grid to be 
used elsewhere. The power provider generally pays the producer for the renewable electricity. 
Smart meter data flow 
Some works in the literature (IEEE Standards Coordinating Committee, 2011; Nam-
boodiri, Aravinthan, Mohapatra, Karimi, Jewell, 2013) identified data exchanged between 
Smart Grid elements. We classified smart meter data flow in seven groups as shown in Table 
1.  
 
Table1. Smart meter data flow 
 Group Interfaces Data 
Smart meter 
G1 
Neighbors meters 
Meter reading, Pricing data, Billing, 
G2 
Concentrators/aggregator 
Metering reading, voltage,  
G3 
Home Appliance 
Energy management,Devices control 
G4 Plug-in Electronic vehicles Load shedding, Storage, Positioning 
G5 
Distributed Energy Resources 
Generation, storage,  
G6 
Workforce Mobile 
Geographic position, maintenance 
G7 
Internet 
Energy profile, billing 
 
Each group (G) represents data exchanged through a specific smart meter interface (see 
Table1). The group G1 represents communications of smart meter with his neighbors’ meters. 
The smart meter sends over a neighbor’s meter a set of information to the concentrator (G2). 
Several types of data (Time of use, energy consumption…) are exchanged between the smart 
meter and home devices (G3). Authors of (Namboodiri, et al, 2013) showed that home appli-
ances can be classified into four groups. Group 1 contains devices (e.g. Television, refrigera-
tor) that need to inform the smart meter only when they are connected and disconnected from 
the system. Devices in group 2 (e.g. Stove) will need to send its power usage and expected 
duration of usage whenever possible. Group 3 contains devices (e.g. Air-conditioner and 
washer/dryer) that request the smart meter and wait for its acceptance to be switched on. Elec-
tronic vehicles are classified in group 4 due to the expensive load and need timely and ade-
quate control. The smart meter communicates with the electronic vehicle (G4) when it is 
Proceedings of the 5th International Conference on Computing and Informatics, ICOCI 2015 
11-13 August, 2015, Istanbul, Turkey. Universiti Utara Malaysia (http://www.uum.edu.my ) 
Paper No.  
110 
 
398 
 
plugged into an on-site charging station. Distributed energy Resources (DER) communicates 
with the smart meter (G5) in order to use energy of this type of resources. Workforce mobile 
access the smart meter (G6) and provide faster diagnosis and performs repair work. The smart 
meter uses the Internet connection (G7) as the home to communicate with the service provid-
er.  
RELATED WORKS 
Some works in the literature identified threats and attacks that can be performed on smart 
meters. Some of them focused on networks where the smart meter is involved while others 
studied its interactions with devices and systems in various domains. Works in (Namboodiri, 
et al, 2013; Sophia et al., 2012) give a survey of smart meter security problems and challeng-
es. Authors of (Namboodiri, et al, 2013) focused on HAN scenarios and identified four types 
of attacks (Jamming, replay, non-repudiation and equipment impersonation attacks). For ex-
ample, the smart meter cannot responds to electronic devices commands when an attacker 
performs a jamming attack on the shared medium. It can also act inappropriately or disrupts 
critical home appliance (e.g. Switches on/off devices) when it responds to a false or replayed 
requests. Authors of (Wang, Xu, & Khanna, 2011) pointed also that attackers can manipulate 
smart meter hardware and firmware. For example, an attacker can stop meter reading by 
shielding the antenna of the wireless module of the smart meter. Works on (Sophia et al., 
2012; Wang et al, 2012) describes several attacks that can be launched on the NAN network 
and may affect routing protocols (NAN sniffing, black hole attack, spoofing data). For exam-
ple, an attacker can claim having a nearest path to the concentrator node and then he can drop 
or alter all incoming packets while the network cannot guarantee that it has transferred the 
original packet. Authors of (Kenneth et al., 2014; Efthymiou & Kalogridis, 2010) addressed 
the privacy problem for smart meters. The smart meter data can be manipulated by a mali-
cious node to get personal and critical information such as when customers are at home which 
could be inferred from energy consumption information. Authors of (Mohassel, Fung, Mo-
hammadi, & Raahemifar, 2014) give a survey of security challenges of the Advanced Meter-
ing Infrastructure (AMI) system. This infrastructure includes smart meters, communication 
networks and Meter Data Management Systems (MDMS) and allows collecting metering 
data. Once an attacker has access to the AMI data, he will also have access to information 
collected for billing purposes. Authors of (Temple et al., 2013) showed that attackers may use 
the Remote Connect Disconnect (RCD) commands to cause a widespread blackout. This at-
tack may simplify the access of criminals to homes.  
ATTACKS ON SMART METERING 
In this section, we highlight additional attacks that can be performed on the smart meter 
and we define five clusters of attacks having different kinds of impacts as shown in Table 2.  
 
Table 2. Attacks on Smart meters 
Cluster (C) Attacks  
Energy management (C1) 
Forgery, Replay, Spoofing, Jamming 
Customer benefits (C2) 
Forgery, Spoofing, Dropping, Denial of Service  
Financial gains (C3) 
Spoofing, Impersonation for billing energy, Forgery and replay 
Routing Data (C4) 
Modification and black forwarding  
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Privacy (C5) 
Eavesdropping, tracking 
  
Attacks impacting energy management 
Forgery attacks: Sending false messages to inform the smart meter that a device is con-
nected could lead the smart meter to take the decision to stop other home devices or prevent 
some devices turning on while energy is available. For example an attacker sends a false re-
quest to the smart meter to turn on the air conditioning. In order to balance the energy in the 
home and avoid the overloading, the smart meter switches off the charging of the electronic 
vehicle. Distributed energy resources (DER) inform the smart meter about the amount of en-
ergy generated that can be used to satisfy an increase home demand. An attacker can send 
false information about the energy generated by DER. If the quantity announced is bigger 
than the energy produced by DER, the smart meter uses the energy of the storage station and 
then it could not respond to the home energy demands. Moreover, the control center can re-
mote disconnect the smart meter when a customer did not pay energy bills or for a remote 
maintenance work. An attacker can exploit these kinds of commands to stop the smart meter 
and prevent home appliance from energy. This attack can have a serious impact if it is per-
formed against a smart meter of a critical Building (hospital, police station….) or performed 
on a large scale to disconnect all meters of a district. Additionally, the outage management 
system can send to the smart meter outage notifications to reduce energy consumption. An 
attacker can send a false outage notification, so the smart meter stops some devices at home 
while energy consumption is low.  
Replay attacks: many commands and messages can fall into replay attacks and therefore 
affect the delivery of energy. In HAN, attackers can replay messages of home devices as a 
result some devices can shutdowns. For example, if an attacker replays a request of an elec-
tronic vehicle that need to be charged at home, the smart meter turn of other home devices to 
reduce energy consumption and avoid an overloading while the Plug-in Electronic Vehicle 
(PEV) is not connected. Additionally, replaying commands of control center can affect the 
delivery of energy. For example, to disconnect a smart meter from the energy network, an 
attacker can replay an old disconnect command.  
Spoofing attacks: when an attacker spoofs the identity of a smart meter, smart appliances 
send requests to the hacker and may not have responses. Appliances that wait for the response 
of the smart meter such as air conditioning, electronic vehicles cannot turn on. The attacker 
that spoofed the smart meter identity can communicate with distributed substation and regu-
late energy voltage. As a result, the energy delivered into home will not be conformed to as 
devices demands. Moreover, the smart meter communicates with distribution substation to 
buy energy generated by DER. An attacker that has the identity of the smart meter can inform 
distribution substation that it has energy at storage stations. Therefore, the distribution substa-
tion purchases energy and delivered it elsewhere yet the victim smart meter needs this quanti-
ty of energy to satisfy energy demands at home.  
Jamming attacks: when an attacker launches a jamming attack on the smart meter, he 
prevents it to send home energy demands to distribution substations. So, home devices could 
only work according to the energy available in a period where energy consumption was low. 
  
Attacks impacting customer benefits 
Forgery attacks: When a hacker sends a false dynamic pricing, it will make the smart me-
ter turn on several electronic devices as well as the electronic vehicle while price is height and 
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increase the customer’s energy bill. An attacker can send a false quantity of energy generated 
by DER. When the quantity announced of energy is not sufficient for home energy needs, the 
smart meter will use the energy provided by the distribution network that is more expensive. 
Spoofing attacks: A malicious node can spoof the identity of a legitimate smart meter in or-
der to modify meter reading. As a result, the energy bill will not correspond to customer ener-
gy consumption. When an attacker spoof identity of a legitimate smart meter, it can send false 
position to workforce and it will not be able to reach the smart meter for repair work.  
Dropping attacks: The attacker drops the pricing packets, so the smart meter cannot be in-
formed by the variation of electricity prices. The smart meter stays using a large quantity of 
energy while the price of energy was increased.  
Denial of service attacks: An attacker can perform a denial of service attack by continuously 
sending a large number of metering requests (outage information, metering reading…). This 
can result a prevent communicating to the smart meter. 
Attacks to get financial benefits   
Spoofing attacks: The electronic vehicle communicates with the smart meter in order to 
charge its battery using public charging stations. Malicious node can use the identity of an 
electronic vehicle to benefices of charging without be billed consumption on his associated 
smart meter.  
Impersonation for billing energy: A malicious node can send energy consumption with 
false smart meter identity. In this case, a hacker gains the use of energy without billed it. 
However, the smart meter victim has an increased electricity bill. 
Forgery and replay attacks: Customers that do not pay their electricity bills can forge re-
mote connect commands to be reconnected to the electricity network. In other hand, to bene-
fice of energy for some time without paying a bill, the hacker can replay old messages of re-
connect smart meter. An attacker can forge or replay message to tell substation that he will 
deliver energy generated by Distributed Energy Resources into the electricity grid. However, 
he does not deliver any quantity of energy. So, the power provider pays the attacker producer 
for the renewable electricity that is not delivered into the grid. 
Attacks impacting routing protocols 
Modification and black forwarding attacks: A malicious node can spoof the identity of a 
smart meter and modify the data before forwarding it to the destination.  In addition, an at-
tacker can claim that he has the best route and concentrator even though it does not have any 
valid routes to the destination.  
Attacks on privacy  
Attackers can collect private information and extract movements inside the house. For ex-
ample, determine which medical devices are used, when the TV has just been turned on, 
which kitchen device is operating. In addition, by eavesdropping meter readings, attackers can 
find out when someone is or not at home and how long he stays there. Moreover, an attacker 
can track your displacements and get access to your geographic positions from information 
sent by an electronic vehicle when it charges its battery at a public infrastructure. 
SECURITY CHALLENGES AND FUTURE WORKS 
Securing the Smart Grid, from the control center to the distributed substations, Intelligent 
Electronic Devices (IED) and even to customer meters, requires a global end-to-end security 
infrastructure. This infrastructure has to envisage security solutions for networks (HAN, NAN 
and FAN) and endpoints (Smart meters, IED, substations, control center) that tier network 
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together. An end-to-end security architecture can be deployed by the provision of security 
mechanisms for wireless technologies of all smart grid networks. The Zigbee specification 
presents a number of security provisions for devices, but studying the performance of Zigbee 
security mechanisms for the HAN and NAN stays an open research topic. On the other hand, 
(CISCO, 2012) pointed out the use of IPsec protocol to provide an en-to-end security archi-
tecture for the Smart Grid network. In this case, a study of IPsec for Smart Grid networks has 
to be considered. The deployment of IPsec in the Smart Grid network may introduce some 
issues while Smart Grids present particular constraints (real-time data, delay…). 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Smart meter is an essential device of the Smart Grid that offers many kinds of applica-
tions. These applications aim to manage energy inside home, report significant energy infor-
mation to the control center and provide the flexibility to use the renewable energy resource. 
The smart meter is vulnerable to many types of attacks (Eavesdropping, forgery, replay at-
tack…). These attacks have many goals as impacting the energy flow, customer benefits, get 
financial gains and also obtain private information about customers. Communications of 
smart meter cross many domains and networks that use various communications technologies. 
To design security for the Smart Grid, it is important to study the deployment of an end-to-
end security architecture. 
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